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We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders.
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where one side has the ability to impose surrender on the other. Under uncer-
tainty and incomplete information, in the unique equilibrium of the game, long
confrontations occur: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) op-
timism, and it persist longer when both agents are optimists but reality proves
both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually
be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit com-
putation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected
losses as a function of i) the costs of confrontation, ii) the asymmetry of the
split imposed under surrender, and iii) the strengths of contenders at attack
and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.
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1 Introduction
We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. We
focus on the frictions and impasses that take place during this type of disputes. Wars
are not seamless processes in which contenders battle constantly until they agree to
stop fighting or one of the sides collapses. Wars are rather characterized by alternating
periods of negotiation and hostilities in which parties fight, obtain or lose advantage,
bargain and make demands to their opponents. In addition, these demands tend to
be very persistent. Contenders often make outrageous claims that are only withdrawn
after a protracted war. One of the main reasons for this is that contenders are actually
non-unitary agents. Countries often raise claims thanks to the efforts of radical groups
and because assessors feed only positive news to leaders who in turn tend to ignore
negative information due to nationalism or patriotism. These biases make countries
reluctant to withdraw unreasonable claims and refuse bargaining.1
We build up a model that includes these distinctive features of war. We consider
a set-up in which two parties must resolve a dispute that could potentially go on for
ever. The existence of phases of negotiation and fighting is modelled as a multi-stage
Markov game where over time players may find themselves in a bargaining state, where
one party makes a proposal and its acceptance by the other ends the game, or in a
claim state, where bargaining is suspended. Claim states can be thought as situations
in which one of the parties has obtained a military victory and is in the position of
making a demand biased to her benefit. At that point, the game can terminate only
if the opponent surrenders to such claim. A claims entails a commitment that can
only be reversed when the side that makes it is defeated in confrontation.
Rejection of proposals during bargaining states or opposition to claims during
1 ’While it is hard for a government, particularly a responsible government, to appear as irrational
whenever such appearance is expedient, it is equally hard for a government, particularly a responsible
one, to guarantee its own moderation in every circumstance.’(Schelling, 1966, p. 41).
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claim states make the game continue with the conflict unresolved. This is costly
to both parties. In the following period, the state of the game can change from
a bargaining state into a claim state, or vice-versa. These changes are randomly
determined by transition probabilities which depend on the strength of each side. One
could thus interpret claim states as situations in which a country has obtained through
confrontation the control of a territory or landmark of great value (an oleoduct, an
emblematic city, or a diamond mine) which was the source of the dispute in the first
place2. The control of this landmark is only temporary and it persists or is lost
with randomness. The control of the landmark becomes permanent (and the conflict
terminates) only when one side claims control and the opponent surrenders, or else,
in a bargaining state, with an agreement to share it.
Our analysis takes off with the characterization of equilibria under complete in-
formation, when the persistence of claims and the strength of the players are known.
For any value of the parameters agreement prevails immediately in bargaining states.
As usual in alternating-offer bargaining, the proposer offers a share that leaves the
responder just indifferent to her continuation value upon confrontation, which is ac-
cepted. The (potential) gains attainable in claim states determine the terms of agree-
ment, but players never resort to confrontation. Exploring the circumstances in which
claims are effective and induce surrender provides the main insight of this part of the
analysis: When a claim is established, either it induces surrender - so that it immedi-
ately awards permanent control over the landmark to its temporary claimant - or else
it is met by opposition until it is dismissed by force. Very extreme claims (relative to
their persistence upon confrontation) give such a small payoff to the opponent that
she never surrenders3. Thus, when claims are sufficiently big, confrontation prevails
2For instance, control of the Rumalia oil field was the primary reason behind Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait that initiated the Gulf War of 1990.
3This is a simple but fundamental and ancient principle; Sun Tzu’s Art of War of 510 BC, advises:
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at every period until the bargaining state is re-established. This observation becomes
crucial when we address the effect of uncertainty and private information.
In the second part of the paper we drop the assumption that transitions between
states are governed by constant and well known probabilities and we introduce asym-
metric information. Incomplete information is one of the most prominent causes of
conflict in bargaining (Sanchez-Pages, 2010). Because power is difficult to observe
and measure, parties typically ignore their strength in case of war and can only learn
about it by fighting. In order to account for this we consider two layers of uncertainty.
One is that parties know their own type, hostile or lenient, but not the type of the
opponent. Second, at bargaining states, countries do not know how likely they (and
their opponent) will be able to maintain control if the game moves to a claim. They
just know the distribution from which the persistence of claims will be drawn. This
information becomes public when disagreement leads the game to a claim state. With
this set-up we are then able to capture environments where ’War is a dispute about
the measurement of power’ (Blainey, 1973, p. 114.)
Under these informational assumptions, war can arise even when the game starts
in a bargaining state: In the unique equilibrium strategy profile a very rich range
of outcomes may occur. These histories capture the different patterns that arise in
real-world disputes. For one set of parameters parties exchange a number of offers
and counteroffers before reaching an agreement. This is consistent with the obser-
vation that many interstate disputes do not entail actual hostilities, like the Second
Moroccan Crisis of 1911 or the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. For natural parame-
ter configurations war does start with positive probability. If the claim state does
not induce immediate surrender because the claim is too large, a (potentially very
long) phase of confrontation follows until the claim is dismissed. In bargaining states,
"Do not press a desperate foe too hard" (Sun Tzu, 1988).
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proposals that are initially rejected may eventually be accepted after a long conflict.
This was the case for instance in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel during
the 70s or between the IRA and the British government in the 90s.
The intuition for these results is the following. The power to sustain claims is
always uncertain, but each party is privately informed about (the probability distri-
bution of) her own power. Hostile (lenient) types have a high (low) expectation of
claim persistence; and consequently expect high (low) payoffs in claim states. In bar-
gaining states -before any claim is established - the proposer can extract a large share
from a lenient responder because such type expects low returns from confrontation.
Suppose that the prior probability that the opponent is a lenient type is high so that
the proposer’s optimism - her anticipation that she can get a large share - has rational
basis. Then, in equilibrium, the proposer demands a share which is acceptable only
by the lenient type. But when the responder turns out to be a hostile type, rejec-
tion follows and war starts. If a claim is established in the sequel, and its realized
persistence is insufficient to induce surrender, war will continue.
As we obtain a unique equilibrium, which is easily computed, our model allows
precise comparative statics: We measure the effect of changes of the different para-
meters on the likelihood and costs of war. We find that war occurs with positive
probability provided that agents’ belief that the opponent is a lenient type is greater
than a given threshold. This threshold is increasing in the cost of confrontation,
claims’ size, and agents’ strength. Thus, departing from situations where war occurs
with positive probability, small parameter changes are irrelevant; but a sufficient in-
crease drops the probability of war to zero. A similar non-monotonicity holds with
respect to the losses of war.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our work to the
literature. The model is formally presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses environ-
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ments of complete information. The main results are in Section 5 where incomplete
information is assumed. Proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 Related literature
The first formulation of war as a joint process of bargaining and fighting was due
to Clausewitz in his classical treaty of 1832. Clausewitz’s ideas inspired many oth-
ers, most notably Blainey (1973) who was especially insightful in his analysis of the
causes of war. He was the first one to argue that optimism about the own resolve
and capabilities was behind most armed conflicts throughout history. In line with
this, Wittman (1979) argued that increasing the probability of military victory can
reduce the probability of agreement because the now stronger party becomes more
demanding. Our results formally support these two intuitions.
Following Blainey, Wagner (2000) argues wars are processes by which parties learn
each others real forces and costs - thus opening the door to agreements that are
impossible without war. Although he does not offer formal results, his discussion
of the process by which wars start, develop and end is suggestive: wars commence
because inconsistent expectations on the consequences of fighting initially prevent
the existence of agreements that both parties prefer to confrontation4; as fighting
proceeds expectations are adjusted and mutual gains from agreement arise.
These insights spawned a generation of bargaining models that explored these
ideas formally. Filson and Werner (2002) discuss a very special (two-period, two-
type) formulation, and emphasize the role of battlefield resource availability. Powell
4The role of asymmetric information in fueling costly conflict is well known in the theoretic
literature. Banks (1990), Bester and Warneryd (1998), Fearon (1995) and Powell (1996), (1999)
propose game-theoretic analysis of war focusing on the role of asymmetric information in prompting
disagreement in negotiations prior to fighting - taking war as an outside option. As war is considered
a game-ending move, the scope of these models is limited to the analysis on the origins of war.
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(2004) models war as a costly process of bargaining during which parties run the
risk of military collapse; he considers uncertainties over either power or the cost
of fighting, which allows comparisons of the learning processes induced in each case.
Sanchez-Pages (2009) examines the effects of limited confrontations on efficiency when
they reveal information about the balance of power. In that case, battles have an
ambiguous effect on welfare because they can help parties to become more realistic
but they can also be used to obtain advantage at the bargaining table. The models
proposed by Slantchev (2003) and Smith and Stam (2004) are the closest to ours.
These authors build on Smith (1998) and, as in the present paper, model war as a
Markov game. Sides fight for the control of a number of forts and war terminates
when one of the sides captures all of them. These papers focus on how these limited
conflicts shape agreements and influence the duration of wars.
With the exception of Smith and Stam (2004), all these models assume one-sided
private information with common priors. They show that separating equilibria can
be sustained and provide insights on the process of information revelation that un-
ravels through war based on the properties of equilibria. However, as Powell (2004)
emphasizes, these results are extremely sensitive to the details of the game or the
equilibrium notion. A general problem in all these models is the great multiplicity of
equilibria, which makes comparative statics very problematic. Furthermore, the as-
sumption that one of the parties is fully informed has such powerful implications that
conclusions cannot extend to setups with two-sided incomplete information. Smith
and Stam (2004) argue that war arises due to disagreements on beliefs, and formulate
such disagreement as different a prior beliefs on military capabilities. Their approach
is effective to supply tractable and transparent predictions. Such predictions, how-
ever, rely on the specific details of these beliefs; this requires common knowledge
of the non-common priors, a problematic assumption, which inconsistent with any
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presumption of full rationality by the parties.
The present paper shares with Smith and Stam (2004) the premise that disagree-
ments on beliefs are crucial, but maintains the analysis in the realm of Bayesian
games with common priors. This comes at the price of being unable to explore the
role of war as a process of information transmission; in our model private information
triggers war, but it is commitment that sustains its continuation. However, thanks
to the simplicity of the informational set up, our model delivers a unique equilibrium
which is straightforward to characterize, and allows a symmetric treatment of agents.
In addition, the equilibrium of the game features a rich variety of outcomes that
capture the variety of patterns in real-world disputes. As pointed out by Leventoglu
and Tarar (2008), all the bargaining models of war mentioned above do not create the
opportunity for an agreement to be reached after an exchange of offers and counterof-
fers. Either agreement is immediate or conflict takes place. For a set of parameters,
the equilibrium of the game entails an agreement being reached after some rounds of
bargaining and without further escalation5. In other cases war follows after a failure
of negotiations. This conflict may be long and full of "fortune reversals".
Finally, our analysis rests on the assumption that claims entail a commitment
that cannot be withdrawn once made. In the strategic literature, it has long been
recognized that unilateral commitment awards advantage; and that attempts to attain
commitment or to dismiss that of opponents’ are a fundamental source of conflict
(Crawford 1982, Schelling 1960). The literature on war has explored several reasons
for such inflexibility. Fearon (1994) suggests that leaders can create audience costs
to signal credibly their capabilities and resolve because backing down in the presence
of these costs can jeopardize leaders’ tenure. However, these costs may also lead to
5Some other mechanisms can deliver agreements without escalation. Schultz (1998) shows that
domestic political competition can make goverment’s threats credible under incomplete information.
Bevia and Corchon (2010) explore the role of pre-war transfers as a conflict-prevention mechanism.
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lock-in situations and force leaders to wage war. On the other hand, Morelli and
Jackson (2007) show that countries can go to war despite it being inefficient because
of political bias, that is, the difference in incentives between pivotal decision makers
and the society as a whole.
3 The game
Two players i = 1, 2 must split one unit of surplus. Time is discrete t = 0, 1, 2, ... The
state of the game establishes the moves available for each player at each date. There
are four possible states, two bargaining states sbi, where no player holds a claim and
bargaining proceeds with an exchange of proposals, and two claim states, sci in which
one player holds a claim and bargaining is suspended. In state sbi, player i is the
proposer, she chooses a proposal, any pair (xi, 1− xi), 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, then, player j,
decides whether to accept or reject. On the other hand, in state sci, only player j = i
moves, and her choices are opposition or surrender. Surrender terminates the game,
i takes her claim ci, 1/2 < ci ≤ 1, and j gets 1 − ci. Upon rejection or opposition,
one period of confrontation takes place and the game moves to the following period.
When confrontation occurs at t the state at t+ 1, st+1, is randomly determined with
probabilities that depend on the state at t, st, according to the transition probability
matrix of Table 1.
t\
t+1 sb1 sb2 sc1 sc2
sb1
p2t
2
p2t
2
0 1− p2t
sb2
p1t
2
p1t
2
1− p1t 0
sc1
1−q1t
2
1−q1t
2
q1t 0
sc2
1−q2t
2
1−q2t
2
0 q2t
Table 1: The matrix of transition probabilities between states.
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The parameters qit and 1 − pit measure i’s strength, respectively at defense and
attack: qit is the probability that player i will maintain her claim into period t + 1
(i.e. the persistence of player i’s claim at t) while 1−pit is the probability that player
i establishes a claim when she rejects a proposal in bargaining state sbj.
Confrontation is costly. When the outcome of the game is perpetual confrontation
both agents obtain 0. Upon a termination that allocates shares (zi, 1− zi) at date t
agent i obtains δtzi, with 0 < δ < 1.
A history of the game at t is a sequence of states of the game from 0 to t, the
rejected proposals or opposed claims from 0 to t−1, and possibly a standing proposal.
A strategy for player i, denoted σi, selects the action of player i at each history in
which she must move. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if, at every
history, the actions of both players are mutually best responses. A strategy profile
is stationary if actions depend only on the state of the game. We use the term
equilibrium to refer to a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies.
The present game is related to the general class of bargaining games studied in
Merlo and Wilson (1995), where the set of admissible agreements and the bargaining
protocol follow a Markov process. Unfortunately our analysis cannot build on theirs
since their characterization of equilibria relies on the assumption that, at all states,
agents can choose an agreement from a standard bargaining set; this assumption fails
in our game because in claim states there is a unique feasible termination.
4 Equilibria when strength is known
Assume that transition probabilities are known and remain constant qit = qi, pit = pi
for all t, and let 0 < qit, pit < 1, i = 1, 2 so that no state of the game is absorbing.
Equilibrium outcomes and payoffs depend on whether claims meet opposition or
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surrender. We will show that agreement necessarily prevails in bargaining states. Sur-
render may prevail under both claim states, in one but not in the other, or opposition
may occur in both. We will prove that only the first and the third scenario exclude
each other.6 We say that i’s claim ci is relevant at a given equilibrium σ , if it pays i
at least as much as one period of confrontation; that is ci ≥ δ (qivi(sci) + (1− qi) vi) ,
where vi denotes player i’s average payoffs in bargaining states and vi(sci) denotes
her expected payoffs in state sci. Formally, the following condition assures that the
claims of both players are relevant.7
RC : Claims are relevant, for i = 1, 2,
ci ≥ max
{
(1− qi)δ
1− δqi
,
1
2
}
. (1)
We start examining how the prevalence of agreement/surrender is linked across
states. Observe than in equilibrium, the following remarks apply:
If surrender prevails in state sci, then agreement is reached in state sbj.
If surrender prevails in states sc1 and sc2, then agreement prevails in states sb1
and sb2.
To understand the first observation, note that, in a bargaining state with 2 as
proposer, a disagreement would prevail if and only if 1 preferred to reject any share
that 2 were willing to propose; that is if δ (p1v1 + (1− p1)c1) ≥ 1 − δ(p1v2+ (1 −
p1)(1−c1)), or equivalently p1(v1+v2)+(1−p1) ≥
1
δ
, but the latter inequality cannot
hold since v1 + v2 ≤ 1 in any equilibrium. Similarly if surrender prevails in sc2, then
6Consequently, the uniqueness of stationary equilibria - a standard feature in bargaining games
of alternating proposals - is not assured in asymmetric environments.
7ci ≥
δ(1−qi)
1−δqi
implies that ci ≥ δ(qici + (1− qi)vi) for all vi ≤ 1; that is, a share ci dominates the
payoff from continuation even if the payoff in the bargaining state is 1.
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disagreement cannot prevail at sb1. Our second observation follows immediately from
the first.
We therefore conclude that confrontation cannot occur in bargaining states. If
there is confrontation in equilibrium, it must occur in a claim state. Is opposition
possible in claim states, or do claims always induce surrender? A claim ci cannot
induce surrender when the share obtained upon surrender, 1 − ci, is bounded above
by the expected gains of an additional period of confrontation. That is, when
1− ci < δ (qivj(sci) + (1− qi) vj) , (2)
where vj(sci) denotes j’s expected payoffs in sci. If (2) holds opposition prevails, so
expected payoffs vj(sci) and vi(sci) must solve vj(sci) = δ (qivj(sci) + (1− qi) vj) and
vi(sci) = δ (qivi(sci) + (1− qi) vi) ; therefore vj(sci) =
(1−qi)δvj
1−δqi
and vi(sci) =
(1−qi)δvi
1−δqi
.
Substituting the expected payoffs in (2), we obtain that the necessary and sufficient
condition for surrender at sci is
1− ci ≥
(1− qi)δvj
1− δqi
. (3)
Writing
φi (vj) ≡
1− ci − δvj
δ (1− ci − vj)
, (4)
condition (3) is equivalent to qi ≥ φi(vj); in other words, the claim ”must not be
merely transient,”8 it must persist at least with probability φi(vj).
9 Then it follows
(see the Appendix for a detailed argument) that confrontation prevails only in claim
states. This completes the proof of our first proposition:
8 ’If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant
than the sacrifice that you call on him to make. The hardships of that situation must not of course
be merely transient. Otherwise the enemy would not give in but would wait for things to improve”
(Clausewitz, 1976, p. 77).
9Note that φi (vj) is strictly increasing in vj and satisfies 0 < φi (vj) < 1, if and only if δvj ≥ 1−ai.
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Proposition 1. Assume RC. In equilibrium the following hold:
1. P 	
 

 


: in claim states, player j surrenders
and the split (ci, 1− ci) is imposed if and only if qi ≥ φi (vj).
2. C
 	  	
 
: Termination, by agreement or
surrender, is immediate unless a claim state occurs and qi ≤ φi(vj).
Proposition 1 implies that any equilibrium profile must be one of the following
three: a) A confrontation profile, where agreement is reached in bargaining states, and
confrontation prevails otherwise. b) A peaceful profile, where agreement or surrender
occurs at all states. c) An i−advantage profile, where agreement or surrender occurs
in all states except scj.
The complete characterization of equilibria in general, non symmetric, environ-
ments involves straightforward but rather tedious algebra. We present it as Propo-
sition 5 in the Appendix. Here we concentrate in symmetric environments; that is
those satisfying:
SYM Strengths are symmetric; for i = 1, 2, ci = c, qi = q and pi = p.
Under SYM an equilibrium cannot be an i−advantage profile; and the equilibrium
expected payoffs at bargaining states are v = 1
2
. Therefore, in claim states, surrender
prevails if and only if q ≥ φ(1
2
) = δ/2−(1−c)
δ(c−1/2)
. Then a unique equilibrium exists and it
is easily described:
Proposition 2. Eusc	usc     	

. Under RC and SYM there is a unique equilibrium.
1. When q ≥ δ/2−(1−c)
δ(c−1/2)
, the equilibrium is a peaceful profile: In state sbi, i offers
to j a share δ
[
p1
2
+ (1− p)c
]
and she accepts; in state sci, j surrenders and i’s
claim of share c is imposed.
13
2. When q < δ/2−(1−c)
δ(c−1/2)
, the equilibrium is a confrontation profile: In state sbi, i of-
fers to j a share δ
2
[
p+ (1− p) (1−q)δ
(1−δq)
]
and she accepts; in state sci, confrontation
prevails.
This Proposition shows that the persistence of claims awards an advantage in war
but not necessarily their size. Note that φ(1
2
) is increasing in c so bigger claims are
more likely to induce a confrontation equilibrium. When claims are excessive, they
are met with opposition and thus players prefer to avoid them when they are in a
bargaining state. As long as the game starts in a bargaining state, an agreement
prevails immediately and claims are never raised. Still, if the game begins in a claim
state and persistence q is relatively low, there is confrontation until the claim is
dismissed and a bargaining state arises. In a nutshell, under complete information,
from a bargaining state "one would never need to use the physical impact of the
fighting forces - comparing figures and their strength would be enough."(Clausewitz,
1976, p. 76).
The fact is, however, that in real conflicts parties do resort to confrontation at-
tempting to raise claims, expecting that these will be imposed quickly. But demands
often meet resistance and frequently reverse. Why would then rational agents engage
in confrontation to attempt establishing a claim that might eventually prove so dis-
advantageous? We give an answer this question in the next section, as we extend our
model to account for uncertainty and asymmetric information.
5 Uncertainty and Asymmetric Information
According to Blainey a common trait of wars is that the two parties ”were persuaded
to fight because most of their leaders were excessively optimistic and impatient men,
and persuaded to cease fighting because those leaders, having failed, were replaced by
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more cautious men.” (Blainey, 1973, p. 123). We propose a formal set up in which
Blainey’s description holds precisely. We extend our model to address situations
with uncertainty and asymmetric information and show that in these circumstances,
confrontations might arise (and persist) along the equilibrium path even if the initial
state is a bargaining state.
Our basic assumption is that the probabilities by which players sustain the com-
mitment to their claims are unknown a priori; they have a random value that is
realized only after claims are established. In a bargaining state, when a player con-
siders whether to reject an offer, she has some private information about the strength
of her potential claim, but she learns the precise value of this strength only if, and
after, the claim is established. We assume that there are two types of players, that
we name hostile and lenient, and that types are private information. A hostile type
draws the persistence of her claims from a distribution biased towards high values;
since she expects that her claim will be highly persistent and induce the opponent’s
surrender, she is more inclined to engage in confrontation and consequently is more
demanding in bargaining states. A lenient type, expecting that her claims will have
low persistence and induce opposition, is not inclined to confrontation and therefore
accommodates to lower offers.
An offer is separating if it is acceptable to a lenient opponent but unacceptable
to a hostile opponent; a pooling offer is one acceptable by both types. Suppose that
the proposer makes a separating offer; this triggers war if the responder turns out
to be hostile. Running the risk of war may well be ex-ante optimal (vis à vis to a
pooling offer) when the probability of facing a lenient opponent is high enough. Hence
separating offers are an equilibrium phenomenon when the proposer is an optimist -
her prior beliefs assign high probability to the opponent being lenient - opening the
door to war if the responder is an hostile type. Confrontation leads to a claim state
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with positive probability; upon this event the persistence of the claim is learned. If
such persistence turns out to be high, the (initial) proposer must surrender. But even
a hostile type, that ex ante expects a high persistence, may get a low draw. Then
both players realize that reality has not matched their (rational) expectations, but
they are stuck in confrontation until the claim is dismissed.
We will consider a symmetric environment where q1 and q2 are random variables
whose value is realized only after the respective claim is established. After a player
rejects a proposal and her claim state occurs, the probability to defend the claim is
publicly observed and it remains constant over time as long as the game remains in
the same state; if the game returns to a bargaining state, future realizations of qi
are drawn independently. With this assumption, we do not impose strengths to be
constant as often done in the literature, and we can also account for one of the main
sources of randomness in war.10
We assume that agents have private information on the distribution function of
their own qi. Each period that the game is in a bargaining state, players privately
observe their type (the distribution of qi) for that period. Formally we assume:
U1 c1 = c2 = c >
1
2
and p1 = p2 = p, and these are known.
U2 There are two types of players, τ i ∈ {l, h} , at each st = sbj types are drawn
independently with probability
Pr(τ i = l | st = sbj) = λ, 0 < λ < 1,
and realized types are private information.
U3 qi is drawn with distribution F
τ i at each st = sci such that st−1 = sbj; then it
10”Of all the branches of human activity, war is the most like a gambling game” (Clausewitz,
1976).
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becomes public and remains constant as long as the claim state persists.
U4 F h first order stochastically dominates F l: F h(q) ≤ F l(q) for all q ∈ [0, 1].
Assumptions U1, U2 and U3 are for simplicity. The first two could be relaxed
(at non-negligible notational and expositional cost) to account for larger type sets,
asymmetries and uncertainty on p and c, or serial correlation. Assumption U3 could
also be relaxed to allow that i retains some information advantage on qi after state sci
is realized, assuming that agents learn their own qi quickly while opponents must learn
it by the evidence that the claim persists. This extension would deliver equilibrium
histories where agents initially oppose claims but eventually surrender. U4 is the
crucial assumption.
A system of beliefs for player i, πi, maps histories into probability distributions
over the types of player j. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is an assessment (σ, π) such
that, σ is a pair of strategies that are best response to each other at each history, and
π is a belief profile consistent with Bayes’ rule. At a Markov strategy actions depend
only on the state, the current beliefs and the current offer. Henceforth the term
equilibrium refers to perfect Bayesian equilibrium in Markov strategies. Observe that
an equilibrium is fully characterized by specifying proposals and acceptance/surrender
thresholds for each type at each state. Note that the system of beliefs does not need
to be specified beyond Bayes Rule because, at any off the equilibrium history that
is not terminal, either a claim state is attained and q is fully revealed; or the game
remains in the bargaining state and new types are drawn - in which case players must
believe that their opponent is lenient with probability λ.
Fix an equilibrium and let v denote the ex-ante (before types are drawn) expected
gains of players in bargaining states. (Note that, if rejections occur with positive
probability, v < 1
2
). Observe that in state sci if the probability that i maintains her
17
claim one more period is sufficiently small disagreement prevails: Indeed, by the same
argument used to prove Proposition 1 we know that if state sci occurs the game stays
in confrontation as long as qi ≤ q̂, where q̂ = φ(v) (recall that φ(v) is determined by
equation (4)). Otherwise, for qi > q̂, player j surrenders and the split (c, 1 − c) is
imposed.11
The equilibrium is pooling - so the first proposal is accepted regardless of the
responder’s type and immediate agreement prevails- if and only if the probability that
players are of lenient type is not too high. Otherwise, the equilibrium is separating.
Along the separating equilibrium play proceeds as follows. Player i makes an offer
that leaves j indifferent between acceptance and rejection if she is lenient (and that a
hostile j strictly prefers to reject). Upon rejection, with probability p a new round of
bargaining follows whereas the game enters state scj with probability 1− p. If state
scj is realized, then the value of qj is observed by both parties. Immediate surrender
to shares (c, 1 − c) follows if and only if qj satisfies qj ≥ q̂; otherwise confrontation
follows until the claim is dismissed. At a new bargaining state, the players observe
their new type, a new separating offer is made, and so on.
For a given equilibrium with ex-ante expected gains v, we let rl(v) and rh(v)
denote the responder’s expected gains upon rejection in state sbi, respectively for
a lenient and a hostile responder. Also, Rh(v) denotes the proposer’s continuation
value when her opponent rejects and the updated belief induced by rejection assigns
probability 1 to the hostile type. Now, define λv as the ratio:
λv ≡
1− rh(v)−Rh(v)
1− rl(v)−Rh(v)
, (5)
and we will refer to λv=1/2 as the optimism threshold.
We are now ready to describe the unique equilibrium:
11Note that 0 < q̂ < 1 only if c+ δv > 1.
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Proposition 3. Eusc	usc     
 -

. Under assumptions U1 to U4 there is a unique equilibrium outcome.
1. If the ex-ante probability of facing a lenient type exceeds the optimism thresh-
old, that is λ > λ1/2, then the equilibrium is separating. For all t, in state sbi, i
offers x∗ = rl(v∗) and j accepts only if τ j = l. If τ j = h and st+1 = scj player i
surrenders granting c to j if qj ≥ φ(v
∗); for qj < φ(v
∗(λ)) confrontation prevails
at all t+ k until st+k = sbi.
2. Otherwise, the equilibrium is pooling. For all t, in state sbi, i offers y
∗ = rh(1
2
)
and j accepts.
In bargaining states war starts because the proposer’s optimism, expecting a le-
nient responder with high probability, is not confirmed; it continues in claim states
because the realized persistence disappoints the optimist belief of the hostile type.
The former effect is the well-known risk-return trade-off in the literature on bargain-
ing and war (Sanchez-Pages, 2010). The latter is novel to our model; it is due to the
commitment associated with military operations and advantage. In summary, war
occurs when reality disappoints the proposer’s optimism; and persists longer when
both agents have optimist (rational) expectations that are not realized ex-post.
5. 1 Equilibrium histories
It is now immediate that when λ > λ1/2, so that a separating equilibrium prevails,
a great variety of equilibrium histories are possible, including prolonged confrontation
and fortune reversals. Three categories of wars are possible:
1. S
	
 
: An agreement (1
2
, 1
2
) does not prevail until t = k > 1.
Prior to agreement k− 1 proposals meet rejection (because a hostile responder
is drawn) but neither side ever raised a claim, at t = k the responder type is
lenient and agreement prevails.
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2. W
  : A concession to (c, 1 − c) prevails at t = k + 1. After
sequence of k ≥ 1 rejections in the bargaining state the game enters a claim
state at k+1, then upon the observation that q ≥ qˆ the opponent surrenders.12
3. Fusc 
	: War prevails at least for t = k+n periods; from t = 0 to
k ≥ 1 proposals meet rejection, a claim is established at t = k + 1, q is low, the
claim is opposed and it persists for n periods. The continuation might lead to
immediate agreement or to any history of type 1, 2 or 3.
Stalemated wars end in a negotiated settlement. These account for around 65%
of intestate wars (Leventoglu and Slantchev, 2007). If rejection of proposals does
not imply necessarily the outbreak of hostilities, this equilibrium outcome would also
account for disputes, such as the Cuban Missiles Crisis or the 2007 North-Korea
nuclear crisis, that did not escalate into war.
Fortune reversals are conflicts in which initial claims are reversed and war proves
to be a disaster to the party that attempted to establish them. In the summer of 480
BC Xerxes was about to impose his advantage over Athens: the Persian alliance with
Carthage assured control over the Greek colonies in Sicily and many of the smaller
Greek states were eager to settle peacefully. Still Athens refused to yield and fortunes
were reversed at Salamis. Napoleon’s Russian campaign of 1812 successfully reached
Moscow, yet it failed "because the Russian government kept its nerve and the people
remained loyal and steadfast" (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 628). In the summer of 1940
Hitler was celebrating victory and awaiting Churchill to sue for peace; he did not,
and events took a very different course. Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland in April
of 1982 and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also fall under this category. Wars such
12The assumption that q becomes public immediately when the claim state is realized rules out
equilibria where claims are initially challenged but eventually prevail. Such histories might occur in
equilibrium under the assumption that agents learn their own q quickly while opponents must learn
it by the evidence that the claim persists.
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as the Korean and the Vietnam wars, where parties alternated claims but none was
imposed at the end, are combinations of fortune reversals and stalemated conflicts.
For realizations of the parameters that deliver a separating equilibrium, the prob-
ability of an immediate agreement is λ; and the probability of a stalemated confronta-
tion is (1− λ) (1− p) each period. To evaluate the ex-ante likelihood of victories and
fortune reversals we must measure Pr(q ≥ qˆ), which requires a specification of F l(q)
and F h(q). For simplicity and for the remainder of the paper, we will assume that
F l(q) is a degenerate distribution and F h(q) a two point distribution; the lenient
type draws a low q < 1/2 with probability 1, and the hostile type draws the low q
with probability 1 − α and a high q = 1, with probability α. Under these assump-
tions, the ex-ante probability of a war with victory (fortune reversals) is (1− λ)αp
((1− λ) (1− α)p) per period.
5. 2 The likelihood of war
War occurs with positive probability only when the optimism threshold is low enough,
that is λ1/2 < λ < 1.When this inequality holds, the probability that war starts is
1 − λ > 0 at every period that the game spends in the bargaining state. Conse-
quently, to evaluate how changes in the environment translate into changes on the
probability that war starts, we must examine λ1/2 =
1−rh(1/2)−Rh(1/2)
1−rl(1/2)−Rh(1/2)
, as a function of
the parameters δ, p, c, α.
The values of 1 − p and α measure the strength of players upon confrontation;
greater values translate in increases of the agents’ continuation values upon confronta-
tion. Consequently,
∂λ1/2
∂p
≥ 0,
∂λ1/2
∂α
≤ 0, with strict inequality whenever λ1/2 < 1.
Evaluating
∂λ1/2
∂δ
and
∂λ1/2
∂c
requires some algebra, but it is not hard to check that, λ1/2
is strictly decreasing both in δ and in c. Figures 1 and 2 display λ1/2 as a function of
δ and c for α and the low q fixed at 1/2.
We summarize these observations in the following proposition:
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Proposition 4. The optimism threshold λ1/2 decreases, so the separating equilibrium
(and war) prevails for a wider range of prior belief λ, whenever one of the following
changes takes place:
1. Claims become more extreme.
2. The claim state arises with greater probability.
3. The hostile type expects greater persistence of claims.
4. Per-period losses decrease.
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For F l(q) and F h(q) fixed, the size of claims c and the cost of confrontation 1− δ,
have impact only over the threshold λ1/2, and not on the effective probability of war
1−λ. Hence, small changes in c or δ are inconsequential. However, bigger changes can
either drop the probability of confrontation from 1− λ to 0, or bring it up from 0 to
1− λ. For example, let q = α = 1/2, λ = .83, c = .8, and δ = .8. In this environment
λ1/2 = .79 < λ = .83 < 1; so war occurs with probability 1−λ = .17. A small change
in δ has an effect on λ1/2 but, as long as the inequality λ1/2 < λ = .83 is maintained,
it has no impact in the probability of war. However, with a change to δ > .7, the
inequality is reversed, and with λ1/2 > λ the probability of war drops to zero. Thus,
a sufficient increase in the costs of confrontation can eliminate the possibility of war.
This is consistent with the idea that the steady decrease observed in the number of
wars since 1816 (Gleditsch, 2004, p. 243) might be due to the development and use
of more deadly technologies of warfare.
Likewise, small changes in c have no impact in the probability of war but a suffi-
cient decrease in c, say to c < .7, drops the probability of war to zero. Interpreting
c as the value of a special landmark, our results are consistent with a prevalent fact,
especially in the context of civil wars (Ross, 2003), that links the prevalence of war
with the presence of natural resources. If, alternatively, we interpret c as the salience
of the issue provoking the dispute, our results are consistent with the fact that satis-
faction with the status quo (low c) decreases the likelihood of conflict between Major
Powers (Lemke and Reed, 2001).
5.3 The losses and duration of war.
The difference between potential gains and expected payoffs in equilibrium measures
the expected losses caused by war. Under a pooling equilibrium the ex-ante expected
payoff is v = 1/2 for each agent and therefore no loss is incurred. In a separating
equilibrium the expected loss is 1− 2v > 0.
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In the appendix we establish that under the present specification
v =
1
2
λ+ (1− λ)2g
1− (1− λ)h
,
where h ≡ δ
(
p+ (1−p)δ(1−q)α
1−δq
)
and g ≡ δ(1−p)(1−α)
2
. It is easily checked that 2g+h < 1,
and therefore ∂v
∂λ
= 1
2
1−h−2g
(1−h+hλ)2
> 0. Thus, the worse outcomes are attained at the lower
values of λ that satisfy λ > λ1/2. Figure 3 displays the expected gains as functions of
λ for c = .7, α = p = q = .5, and δ = .9. On the other hand, v increases in δ. Figure 4
displays the expected gains as a functions of δ for c = .7, α = p = q = .5, and λ = .7.
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It is also immediate that v increases in p and decreases in q and α. Let us emphasize
that the qualitative features of this illustrative example are general.
Finally, it is straightforward to see that when λ ≥ λ1/2, other parameters fixed,
Pr(q ≥ qˆ) is greater the lower λ, and the lower δ. This has two implications: First, that
the victory of one side is more likely (i.e. Pr(q ≥ qˆ) is higher) when the probability of
drawing a hostile type is greater. And second, that fortune reversals are more likely
(i.e. Pr(q ≥ qˆ) is lower) when the cost of confrontation is large and the value of claims
increases. The latter effect is consistent with the fact that civil wars in resource-rich
nations are harder to end (Ross, 2003) and with the fact that higher issue salience
worsens the outcome of war for initiator countries (Slantchev, 2004).
6 Final remarks
We have presented a model of bargaining and war where the set of admissible agree-
ments follows a Markov process. Our contribution points out that, when the ability
to exercise commitment is linked to the use of force, uncertainties and informational
asymmetries may fuel prolonged episodes of confrontation. The richness of equilib-
rium outcomes (despite the equilibrium being unique) can account for the wide variety
of patterns observed in wars. Our comparative statics are also consistent with some
empirical studies on the onset and termination of interstate wars.
We carried out this analysis for the simplest scenario, assuming that there are
only two states, and that transitions are governed by stationary probabilities. Real
conflicts have immense sets of states and their transition probabilities are hardly sta-
tionary. Nevertheless the qualitative nature of our results does not rely on our drastic
simplifications. Results would remain unchanged if the responder chose between ac-
ceptance, rejection without confrontation, and rejection with confrontation. At the
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cost of increased complexity we could also consider larger state sets - for example
a state in which both players hold incompatible claims; or we could admit richer
transitions probabilities. The cost of confrontation could also be asymmetric across
players and or states. Our results are robust to such alternative formulations of the
extensive form. We hope they can provide useful intuitions relevant in the analysis
of real, more complex, disputes and guide a revised look at the empirical evidence.
One key assumption of our analysis is that claims entail commitment - i.e. that
a party attaining (temporary) control of the landmark is not free to back down and
bargain unless she is defeated in confrontation. Audience costs, extremism and na-
tionalism can explain these rigidities. Willingly withdrawing a claim earned by force
can also undermine an army’s reputation, and this may be very costly in future or
concurrent conflicts13. Still, the value of these claims and the probabilities to es-
tablish and maintain them have been assumed exogenous. In reality, however, these
probabilities depend on the degree of advantage aimed by a player; as well as on
the opponent’s strength and claim value. An extension of our model allowing that
bargaining parameters are interrelated and endogenously determined by the strategic
choice of the agents will be the object of further research.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
By equation (1), the responder payoffs in state sbi are such that
if (q1, q2)≪ (φ1 (v2) , φ2 (v1)), v
r
i = δvi
(
pi + (1− pi)
(1−qi)δ
1−γqi
)
,
if (q1, q2)≫ (φ1 (v2) , φ2 (v1)), v
r
i = δ (pivi + (1− pi)ai) ,
while the proposer obtains vpj = 1− v
r
i .
Clearly agreement must prevail in a state sbi when confrontation prevails in both
claim states. Hence we only need to consider strategy profiles that yield concession
in state sci but not in state scj.
Consider first profiles that yield concession in state sc1 but not in state sc2. When
1 proposes, 2 accepts as long as her share is at least vr2 = δv2
(
p2 + (1− p2)
(1−q2)γ
(1−γq2)
)
,
and thus agreement can be attained if and only if 1 prefers to offer that share over
disagreement. That is,
δv1
(
p2 + (1− p2)
(1− q2)δ
(1− δq2)
)
≤ 1− δv2
(
p2 + (1− p2)
(1− q2)δ
(1− vq2)
)
,
or equivalently v1 + v2 ≤
1−δq2
δ(δ(1−q2)+(1−δ)p2)
. A condition that always holds since the
second term exceeds 1.
Proof of proposition 3. Fix an equilibrium. Given ex-ante expected gains at
bargaining states v, the continuation values upon a rejection rl(v) and rh(v) are
rl(v) = δ
(
pv + (1− p)
[
vΦl + (1− F l(q̂))c
])
,
rh(v) = δ
(
pv + (1− p)
[
vΦh + (1− F h(q̂))c
])
.
where Φτ ≡ δ
∫ q̂
0
1−q
1−δq
dF τ (q)dq. It is a matter of simple algebra to check that rh(v) >
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rl(v).14. Similarly, the proposer’s continuation value upon responders rejection, when
the induced beliefs are π is
Rπ(v) = pδv + (1− p)δ [vΦπ + (1− F π(q̂))(1− c)] .
Recall that λv ≡
1−rh(v)−Rh(v)
1−rl(v)−Rh(v)
, where Rh denotes Rπ when belief π assigns probability
1 to the hostile type.
Next, we point out that at a pooling equilibrium agreement prevails for sure in the
bargaining states. Assume for the sake of the argument that disagreement prevails
for sure in state sbi. It is then necessary that the proposer prefers disagreement to an
agreement that the lenient responder accepts, that is Rπ(v) > 1− rl(v). However, at
the hypothesized pooling equilibrium profile the beliefs of the proposer upon rejection
are G = λF l + (1 − λ)F h so that the continuation value is Rg(v) = δpv + δ(1 −
p) [vΦg + (1−G(q̂))(1− c)]. It is then immediate to check that v ≤ 1
2
implies that
Rg(v) + rl(v) < 1, a contradiction. Consequently, an equilibrium must be either a
pooling equilibrium where both types accept, or a separating equilibrium where the
responder accepts if and only if she is lenient.
Let us now discuss the necessary and sufficient conditions for pooling or separating
equilibria. Consider first a pooling equilibrium. Since in states sbi the initial proposal
is surely accepted, the complete symmetry of the environment implies that v = 1
2
. If
state sci occurs (off the equilibrium path) confrontation prevails for q < φ(
1
2
). Hence
the responder’s rejection values are uniquely given as rl(1
2
) and rh(1
2
). On the other
hand, if a rejection were to reveal that the responder is hostile the proposer’s rejection
value would be Rh(1
2
). By hypothesis, in state sbi, both types of responder must
14rh(v)− rl(v) = (1− p)δ
[
v
(
Φh −Φl
)
+ c
(
F l(q̂)− Fh(q̂)
)]
and observe that the right hand side
is positive if and only if c ≥ δv Φ
l−Φh
F l(q̂)−Fh(q̂)
, an inequality that holds, since c ≥ 12 , δv <
1
2 and
Φl−Φh
F l(q̂)−Fh(q̂)
< 1.
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accept, hence the proposer must offer y∗ = rh(1
2
). At the alleged pooling equilibrium
the proposer must prefer a sure payoff 1− y∗ over making a lower offer, y′ < y∗, and
getting acceptance only if the responder is lenient. The least that must be offered
to obtain acceptance with positive probability is y′ = rl(1
2
), hence it is necessary
that 1 − rh(1
2
) ≥ λ(1 − rl(1
2
)) + (1 − λ)Rh(1
2
); that is, the prior probability of the
lenient type must not exceed the optimism threshold at v = 1
2
, λ ≤ λ 1
2
. In addition to
necessary, this inequality is also sufficient for the existence of a pooling equilibrium:
It suffices that the belief of the proposer upon (off the equilibrium) rejection assigns
probability 1 to the hostile type.
Next, consider a separating equilibrium. Note that v < 1
2
, because in state sbi the
proposer offers only the rejection value of the lenient type, x = rl(v), which is accepted
by l but not by h.Moreover, the proposers’s beliefs about q upon rejection must be F h
so that the proposer rejection value is Rh(v). Since either player proposes with equal
probability, vmust satisfy v = 1
2
(
λrl(v) + (1− λ)rh(v)
)
+1
2
(
λ(1− rl(v)) + (1− λ)Rh(v)
)
,
that simplifies to
v = λ
1
2
+ (1− λ)
Rh(v) + rh(v)
2
,
Denote the solution to this equation by v∗. This solution always exists, and it is
unique. (It is immediate to check that γ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] , where γ(v) = v− λ1
2
− (1−
λ)R
h(v)+rh(v)
2
, is a contraction and therefore has a unique fixed point.) Furthermore,
note that 0 < v∗ < 1
2
. In state sbi, i must offer r
l(v∗); and this must be preferred to
offering rh(v∗), i.e.
λ ≥ λv∗. (6)
Therefore the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a separating
equilibrium is that λ ≥ λ1/2 : since v
∗ < 1
2
and λv is strictly increasing in v, λ > λ1
2
implies that λ ≥ λv∗. This completes the proof.
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Computation of Equilibrium values
In a separating equilibrium, the ex-ante expected payoff v, must solve v = λ/2 +
(1 − λ) r
h(v)+Rh(v)
2
. It is immediate to check that, under the present specification for
F l(q) and F h(q),
rh(v) = δ
[
pv + (1− p)
(
α
vδ(1− q)
1− δq
+ (1− α)c
)]
,
and
Rh(v) = δ
[
pv + (1− p)
(
α
vδ(1− q)
1− δq
+ (1− α)(1− c)
)]
;
so that
rh(v) +Rh(v)
2
= δv
[
p+ (1− p)α
δ(1− q)
1− δq
]
+ δ(1− p)(1− α)
1
2
.
Writing h ≡ δ
(
p + (1−p)δ(1−q)α
1−δq
)
and g ≡ δ(1−p)(1−α)
2
, v must solve v = λ
2
+ (1 −
λ)(hv + g). Hence
v =
1
2
λ+ (1− λ)2g
1− (1− λ)h
.
It is easily checked that 2g + h < 1, and therefore ∂v
∂λ
= 1
2
1−h−2g
(1−h+hλ)2
> 0. Derivatives
with respect to other parameters are immediate.
Proposition 5. Eusc	
  -, 	 
, -
: Under RC an equilibrium always exists. Moreover,
1. A peaceful equilibrium excludes the existence of a confrontation equilibrium.
Equilibria in 1−advantage strategies and 2−advantage strategies may coexist;
and these may coexist with either a peaceful equilibrium or a confrontation
equilibrium.
2. The expected payoffs of player i in a bargaining state under the four categories
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of (potential) equilibrium profiles, denoted σc, σp, σ1 and σ2, are:
vi(σ
p) vi(σ
i) vi(σ
j) vi(σ
c)
1−δpj+δci(1−pi)−δcj(1−pj)
2−δ(pi+pj)
ρj
ρj+λi
λj
ρi+λj
ρj
ρ2+ρ1
where ρi ≡ 1− δpi − (1− pi)
(1−qi)δ
2
1−δqi
and λi ≡ 1− δ(pi + ci(1− pi)).
Remark. The multiplicity of stationary equilibria opens the door to subgame
perfect equilibria in which confrontation occurs in the bargaining state, provided
that non-stationary strategies are allowed. Since this is a standard result we do not
elaborate it further.
Proof.
The values of expected payoffs at bargaining states for each of the potential equi-
librium strategy profiles, σc, σp and σi, i=1,2, follows from straightforward algebra.
It is also immediate to check that vii > max {v
c
i , v
p
i } > min {v
c
i , v
p
i } > v
j
i .
Given a configuration of parameters (c1,c2, p1, p2) define the sets
Qc = {(q1, q2) | (q1, q2)≪ (φ1(v
c
2), φ2(v
c
1))} ,
Qp = {(q1, q2) | (q1, q2)≫ (φ1(v
p
2), φ2(v
p
1))} ,
Qi =
{
(q1, q2) | qi > φi
(
vij
)
, qj ≤ φj (v
i
i)
}
.
Necessary and sufficient conditions to sustain each of the potential profiles as an
equilibrium are now immediate:
1. A peaceful equilibrium exists if and only if (q1, q2) ∈ Qp;
2. A confrontation equilibrium exits if and only if (q1, q2) ∈ Qc;
3. An i−advantage equilibrium exits if and only if (q1, q2) ∈ Q
i.
Therefore what profiles can prevail as equilibria for each parameter configuration
depends on the specific geometry of Qc,Qp, Q1 and Q2. Consider first the set Qp since
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it is specially simple: Since vpi is independent of (q1, q2), so is φi(vj) and consequently
Qp = {(q1, q2) | (q1, q2)≫ (q̂1, q̂2)} , (7)
where q̂i = φi(v
p
j ).
On the other hand, observe that Qc can be expressed as
Qc = {(q1, q2) | q1 ≤ ϕ1(q2), q2 ≤ ϕ2(q1)} , (8)
where y = ϕ1(q2) if and only if y solves y = φ1(
ρ1(y)
ρ2+ρ1(y)
), where ρi(y) ≡ 1 − δpi −
(1 − pi)
(1−y)δ2
1−δy
ρi; and analogously for ϕ2(q1). It is straightforward to check that the
functions ϕi are decreasing.
Note that Qc ∩Qp = ∅. Indeed, since both ϕi are decreasing it is straightforward
to check that q̂1 > ϕ2(q̂2) and q̂2 > ϕ1(q̂1).
With respect to Qi observe that (vii, v
i
j) = (
ρj
ρj+λi
, αi
ρj+λi
) depends only on ci and
qj . Hence
Qi =
{
(q1, q2) | qi > ψi(qj), qj ≤ qj
}
, (9)
where qj solves qj = φj (v
i
i) =
1−cj−δ
ρj
ρj+λi
δ
(
1−cj−
ρj
ρj+λj
) and ψi(qj) is φi
(
vij
)
=
1−ci−δ
λi
ρj+λi
δ
(
1−ci−
λi
ρj+λi
) .
Since vii > v
p
i we obtain that qj > q̂j. Moreover, since φi is increasing, ψi(qj) decreases
in qj and furthermore ϕi(qj) > ψi(qj).
We have thus shown that Qi∩Qp = ∅, Qi∩Qc = ∅ and q /∈ Qp∪Qc ⇔ q ∈ Q1∪Q2.
Hence, an equilibrium always exists, it is generally not unique since different types of
equilibria (up to three) may coexist for some parameter configurations; yet a peaceful
equilibrium and an confrontation equilibrium never coexist.
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